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Introduction - Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Vienna 
Convention. 
The Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,1980  
(CISG) was promoted by the United Nations as a replacement for the Uniform Law on 
the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULFIL). It has been ratified by 
countries around the globe with legal and social traditions situate each end of every 
possible spectrum, from the arch-capitalist, United States of America,1 communist 
China2 and Cuba,3 countries following the Islamic Sharia Law such as Iraq4 and 
Syria,5 and developing countries such as Romania6 and Georgia.7 It is designed for 
easy use by both trader and lawyer,8 and for this reason it avoids the use of conceptual 
legal terminology. The Vienna Convention is the product of a synthesis of legal 
systems and is the “fruit of world wide compromise”.9 As such it does not ‘fit 
comfortably with the existing law of every country which adopts it’.10 It is equally 
authoritative in each of its six languages, Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian 
and Spanish,11 and is to be interpreted by national courts, without the help of a central 
interpreting body. Against this background of disparate legal and socioeconomic 
views, the creation of (and the subsequent uniform interpretation of) the Convention 
has been, and will continue to be, quite a challenge. 
 The objective of the drafters of the Vienna Convention was to provide more 
objective principle and more precision in interpretation of the international rules 
governing contracts for the international sale of goods than arose from the ULIS.12 
The question which this article focuses upon is whether there is sufficient clarity in the 
convention in the definition of ‘fundamental breach’, and certainty in how it will be 
applied. In its report on the Convention, the Law Society of England and Wales gave 
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as one of its arguments against its adoption ‘that it will not produce uniformity 
because it will be subject to differing national interpretation’.13 
  
Fundamental Breach distinguished from Non-fundamental Breach 
 The concept of Fundamental Breach, though unfamiliar in many parts of the 
world, is said to be “fundamental to the Convention’s remedy system”.14 As the term 
“fundamental breach” is the lynch pin of the Convention its interpretation is of great 
importance, and it must be distinguished from non-fundamental breach. Bianca & 
Bonnel describe this distinction as being of primary importance and central to the 
whole structure of the Convention.15 
To truly understand the meaning of the term ‘fundamental breach’ it is, 
however, necessary first to understand the context in which the resulting remedy of 
avoidance16 operates, and to identify any alternative remedies such as specific 
performance,17 suspension of performance,18 damages,19 reduction in price20 or other 
remedies that are available to the aggrieved party. The reason is simple: if the problem 
arising from the contract can be resolved by one of the lesser ‘non-fundamental 
breach’ remedies, then the remedy of avoidance will not be available. There is a 
flexible approach to the balancing of these remedies, which is peculiar to the CISG.21  
 
(a) Specific Performance 
 Specific Performance, the main ‘other’ remedy under the Convention, is 
provided for by Article 46(1) (buyer) and Article 62 (seller). The Specific 
Performance remedy is primarily designed for situations of non-delivery or under-
delivery of goods, but Article 46(2) extends its use to include the delivery of substitute 
goods, and Article 46(3) to the specific performance of repairing obligation of 
defective goods. This remedy can be supplemented by a period of ‘Nachfrist’ under 
Article 47(1) and Article 63(1).22 It excludes the remedy of Avoidance only, but not 
the other remedies of Damages or Reduction of Price. The Convention, under Article 
28, limits the application of Specific Performance to situations where it is otherwise 
available under the law of the forum state. 
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(b) Damages 
 Damages is a non exclusive remedy and can be used on its own, or with either 
Specific Performance or Avoidance.23 Failure to comply with contractual obligations 
is sufficient for it to apply, with fault not being relevant. Evaluation of damages, if 
pursuant to Article 74 (residual) of the Convention, or Articles 75 (substitute sale) and 
76 (when the contract is avoided), but is subject to the ‘force majeure’ provisions in 
Article 79. Issues such as interest and period for payment have been left to be resolved 
by national law.24 The costs, however, of preserving the goods, in the event that the 
buyer, for what ever reason, does not pay the price, does not fall within the ambit of 
damages, but is independently recoverable, as far as they are reasonable, under 
Articles 85 and 88(3).25 The issue of liquidated damages clause is not dealt with by 
the Convention, and would appear to require the interpretation of such clauses by the 
underlying domestic law, to be determined by applying choice of law principles.26 
 
(c) Reduction of the Purchase Price 
 A further remedy referred to by the Convention is the reduction of the 
purchase price under Article 50 thereof. This reduction should be the difference in 
value of the goods actually delivered and those that should have been delivered. The 
date of assessment of the difference in price is the date of delivery of the relevant 
goods.27 This remedy can be in addition to damages, though one set of figures would 
be reflected in the calculation of the other. This remedy is not affected by the ‘force 
majeure’ provisions in Article 79, and can apply even when the remedy of damages 
may not. The buyer may not, however, use this remedy if the seller is able to cure the 
non-conformity without causing the buyer unreasonable delay or inconvenience. 
Damages in this latter situation may remain payable. 
 
(d) Other Remedies - Penalty Clauses, and Interest 
 Other remedies not referred to, or inadequately dealt with in the Convention, in 
the absence of express prohibition, may be applicable under the underlying domestic 
law, to be decided by the conflict of law rules of the forum state, e.g. Penalty clauses, 
which is a recognised remedy in Civil law jurisdictions only. Another issue that has to 
be resolved is Interest. This can be payable (in the event of delay in payment of the 
price) without prejudice to any claim for damages.28 As with the remedy of reduction 
of price, it is not affected by the ‘force major’ provisions in Article 79. It would 
appear from Kritzer’s paper29 in the absence of a specific provision in the Convention, 
that the interest rate to be applied is that current at the time at the seller’s place of 
business. 
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The effect of Fundamental Breach 
 Fundamental Breach is defined in Article 25 of the Convention, and can arise 
(by virtue of Articles 49 and 64) in two distinct and defined situations, namely:  
 
(a.) fundamental breach by the seller who fails to fulfill any of his obligations 
under the contract or the Vienna Convention, (subject to the provisions of 
Article 47(1) or Article 63); and 
 
(b.) breach by delay or non delivery of goods (the ‘Nachfrisht’ provisions)  
 
 An aggrieved party has the option to avoid a contract on the occurrence of a 
fundamental breach. The avoidance releases both parties from their obligations to 
perform the contract, but only subject to the payment of any damages that may be due. 
The avoidance equally does not invalidate contractual provisions which deal with 
arbitration, choice of forum, or dispute resolution.30 
 
(a) Fundamental breach by the seller 
Goods delivered pursuant to a contract governed by the Vienna Convention are 
required to be of the ‘quantity, quality, and description required by the contract and 
which are contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract’.31 Goods are 
deemed not to conform with the contract if they breach any of the provisions set out in 
Article 35.2, subject to the provisions of Article 35.3. However, the vendor is not 
liable for any discrepancies under Article 49(2) if, ‘at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract the buyer knew or could not have been aware of such lack of conformity’.32 
Such breach has to be such as to effect the other party ‘substantially to deprive him of 
what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not 
foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not 
have foreseen such a result’33 before fundamental breach can be deemed to have 
occurred. 
 
(b) “Nachfrist” 
 Fundamental breach is one of the two causes of avoidance of a contract given 
under the convention by Articles 49 and 64, the second cause of action being non-
delivery within an additional period of time granted, (Articles 47 and 63), a concept 
similar to the German doctrine of Nachfrist.34 Section 326 of the German Civil Code 
states that where there is a default by one party the other party may give him a 
reasonable time within which to perform his part, with a declaration that he will refuse 
to accept the performance after the expiration of the period stated, If the performance 
is not made within due time, the party who gave this notice, known as Naschfrist, may 
withdraw from the contract. However, Article 48 of the Vienna Convention, (subject 
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to Article 49) permits the vendor, even after the date or delivery is passed, to remedy 
his failure to deliver, at his own expense, ‘if he can do so without unreasonable delay, 
and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty or 
reimbursement by the seller or expenses advanced by the buyer’. This is nevertheless, 
subject to the buyer’s right to recourse to damages.  
 In the event of non-delivery of goods the purchaser, if he is not sure that this in 
itself is a fundamental breach, may fix an additional period for the delivery of the 
goods under Article 47 (and Article 63 - the seller). In the event of non-delivery at this 
later date then the contract may be avoided under Article 49(1)(b), subject to the 
provisions of Article 47 (and Article 63 - the seller). 
 Time is not, in itself, of the essence in the performance of contracts under this 
Convention. This can lead to a problem whether a particular delay in performing a 
contract constitutes fundamental breach, thus allowing the aggrieved party to avoid 
the contract. Equally, in order to rely on delay as a fundamental breach, any possible 
cure, other than avoidance, must cause the aggrieved party ‘unreasonable 
inconvenience’. As stated by Bassindale and Fletcher,35 ‘these questions will be 
particularly difficult to answer in the context of lengthy trading chains’ or in the 
commodity markets.36 Avoidance is a complex and ‘thorny’37 problem since the non-
offending party must be sure that the breach is fundamental before commencing the 
avoidance procedure, in order not to be held liable for fundamental breach himself. 
The issue of delay must be examined in an international context, taking into account 
issues such as the type of goods and the goods handing facilities available to the 
parties. In many cases it would be very punitive if goods have to be returned around 
the world. It could be more reasonable to repair goods in situ that to re-ship them.38 
 A better and more reliable course of action for a party suffering form delay 
would be to operate the aforementioned ‘Nachfrist’ doctrine, which makes time of the 
essence in the performance under the contract, and ‘thus allows a party awaiting 
performance to eliminate uncertainty concerning the amount of delay that is serious 
enough to justify avoiding the contract’.39 After serving the Nachfrist notice the buyer 
can then ‘avoid the contract with impunity’40 if there is no delivery by the date 
specified in the notice, or if the seller specifically states that he will not be complying 
with the Nachfrist notice. There is, as a result, some doubt as to when delay by itself 
results in fundamental breach, in the absence of the operation of the Nachfrist 
doctrine. The vagueness of the fundamental breach position in cases of delay forces 
the business man to rely on the Nachfrist remedy, thus bringing uncertainty into the 
original contract regarding the date of performance, and weakening the remedy of 
fundamental breach itself.41 
Avoidance  
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 As Article 81(1) states the ‘avoidance of the contract releases both parties 
from their obligations’, subject to any damages that may be due. Avoidance of the 
contract, is only available in very limited circumstances, with the aim of the 
Convention being the reliance by traders on the aforementioned lesser remedies. ‘The 
Convention limits access to this rather drastic form of relief, not only by restricting 
avoidance to cases of “fundamental” (material) breach, but also by widening the 
seller’s right to cure’42 through the non avoidance remedies. Some American 
commentators have noted that, because of this narrow application of the doctrine, it 
will be more difficult to operate the fundamental breach provisions of the Vienna 
Convention than to revoke acceptance or reject shipments, and cancel a contract, 
under the American Uniform Commercial Code.43 It is therefore of the utmost 
importance to be able to distinguish between fundamental breach and non-
fundamental breach. 
 
The Test for Fundamental Breach under the CISG 
 The actual test of Fundamental Breach in the Convention is very different to 
that used in existing Common Law jurisdictions, and is to be assessed ‘not merely by 
reference to the term that was broken, but by reference to the impact of the breach on 
the injured party as well as the perception or contemplation of the guilty party as 
regards the likelihood of the impact or loss’.44 
The term ‘fundamental’ is not adequately defined in the Convention. The only 
accepted guide to the interpretation is that the breach must be “serious,” but we still 
have to look to case law to find a definition of what is ‘serious’. The first assumption 
that one should be able to make is that the Convention provides the same provisions in 
each of its official languages. To understand the meaning, in English, however, of 
‘substantial detriment’45 it is necessary to examine the French, Spanish or Russian 
version, where it can be ascertained that this term is to be interpreted ‘always in a 
rather large and vague sense’46. John Honnold47 is also of the opinion that ‘temporal 
or physical deviations (such as one day or .001 millimeter) have no significance apart 
from the extent of the loss or detriment they cause to the other party’. This would 
appear to introduce an element of subjectivity into the test, as the detriment depends 
on the non breaching party’s personal business situation, and factors that would 
probably not be in the breaching party’s knowledge. 
 The burden of proof regarding issues of unforeseeability has been shifted onto 
the party in breach by the use of the word ‘unless’48. There is no guide in the 
convention as to what information is to be taken into account, and we are forced to 
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rely on academic commentators to shed some light on this issue. While it would 
appear from commentators that ‘information that a party receives too late to affect 
performance seems outside the scope of Article 25’, as there would be no opportunity 
to react to same,49 it is questionable if such commentators will be able to fill this gap 
in the drafting of the Convention, as while and individual may or may not have 
judicial respect in the courts of his or her home jurisdiction, it is unlikely that the same 
regard would be had to such views throughout the time and language zones. Even 
academic scholars differ on this issue. While some commentators are of the opinion 
that foreseeability should always be measured as of the time of contract formation, 
Flechtner50 differs. He is of the opinion that the Convention is drafted to reflect the 
philosophy behind the American U.C.C. section 1-203 thereof which deals with the 
good faith requirement ‘offer flexibility to account for facts that arise after contract 
formation’. 
 
Case Law 
 The case law on the Convention is currently quite sparse,51 as reflected in the 
sentiments of the US Court of Appeals for the second circuit in the case of Delchi 
Carrier SpA v. Roterex Corporation, a case heard on the 6th December 1995, when it 
stated that, ‘because there is virtually no case law under the convention, we look to its 
language and to the general principles upon which it is based’. It will be interesting to 
see to what extent one national court will feel obliged to follow the findings of another 
national court situate at the other end of the globe, and possibly in another, rival, 
trading block. The European courts have got into the habit of looking at their 
neighbour’s case law, and some cohesive interpretation of the Vienna Convention on 
the continent of Europe can be expected. It will be interesting to see if this will be a 
world wide phenomenon. 
 One such case was the case of SARL BRI Productions “Bonaventure” v. Pan 
African Export52 which was heard before the French Cour d’Appel de Grenoble. Here 
the court found that not respecting the wishes of the vendor company (viz. to know the 
destination of the goods) constituted a fundamental breach of contract within the 
meaning of Article 25 CISG.53 
 Non-exclusive use of a distinctive mark on goods also led to fundamental 
breach in a case before the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main.54 This distinctive 
mark was deemed to be a secondary obligation, nevertheless, breach of same was 
sufficiently serious to lead to fundamental breach. (In the commentary on this case,55 
however, it was noted that the German court never referred directly to Article 25.) 
Similarly, breach of an exclusivity clause was also held to be a fundamental breach, by 
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the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main on the previous day.56 Both of these cases 
involved Italian shoe manufacturers. 
 On the issue of breach by one party being a cause for breach by the other party, 
the Russian Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the Russian 
Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry,57 held that violations of the vendors 
obligations, (the delivery of the goods in the absence of a bankers guarantee), could 
not be deemed a fundamental breach as the purchaser had accepted delivery of the 
goods. It may have lead to a valid claim for damages but the aggrieved party had not 
claimed this remedy. 
 Late delivery of goods arose in the case of Roder Zelt-und 
Hallenkonstruktionen GmbH v. Rosedown park Pty Ltd et al,58 heard by the Australian 
Federal Court of the South Australian District to Adelaide, which held that no 
fundamental breach occurred in the event of late payments as no demand for same had 
been made. Similarly in the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce in Case No 7585/92,59 in a case involving an Italian company and a 
Finnish company the Arbitration Court held that delay in payment ‘is not always in 
itself a fundamental breach. According to circumstances, delay of payment for the 
buyer or delay of delivery for the seller cannot be the cause of immediate avoidance of 
the contract’. This would appear to severely limit the availability of non-Nachfrist 
fundamental breach. However, in another Italian case, Fielopack Ag v. Denisplast 
SpA60 dispatch of goods after having received notification of the cancellation of the 
contract, and then only partial delivery occurring was held to be fundamental breach. 
While further examination of the facts of the two cases may be of merit, there appears 
to be a dichotomy of interpretation even between these two cases. The US courts, on 
the same issue, appeared to follow the Italian reasoning, as they held in the case of 
Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corporation61 that a delay in the shipment of goods 
according to agreed installment dates, and the non conformation with performance 
specifications of the goods that did arrive, was held to be fundamental breach. 
 
 
The effect of Fundamental Breach on other Parts of the CISG - Anticipatory 
Breach, Suspension of Performance, and Partial Performance Breach 
 The definition of Fundamental Breach affects many other articles of the 
Vienna Convention, to include Anticipatory Breach,62 Suspension of Performance,63 
Partial Fundamental Breach.64 
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(a) Anticipatory Breach 
 The doctrine of Anticipatory Breach is familiar to lawyers from common law 
jurisdictions. It covers two circumstances, the related remedy of suspension of 
contractual obligations, and the avoidance of the contract.65 Under the provisions of 
Article 71 a party may suspend the performance of his obligations under the contract if 
it is clear that the other party will not perform his obligations as a result of  
 
1. a serious deficiency in his ability to perform or in his creditworthiness, or, 
2. his conduct is preparing to perform or in performing the contract. 
 
However a party must continue with the performance of the contract if he is given 
adequate assurances from the other side that there will be performance of the contract. 
 
(b) Suspension of Performance 
 Prior notice in the event of anticipatory breach, of the intention to avoid, is not 
required, and the defaulting party need not be given an opportunity to provide an 
adequate assurance of future performance, unlike the situation for Suspending 
Performance, where under Article 71(3) immediate notice of suspension muse be 
given to the other party, and performance must continue if he receives an adequate 
assurance of performance from the other party. 
 There is, however, no right to use suspension as a weapon of coercion with 
regard to minor obligations.66 The possibility arises that there may be situations when 
a fundamental breach may be caused by something less than substantial ‘since the 
Egyptian amendment making suspension conditional upon a prospective fundamental 
breach was rejected’.67 It is also unclear whether the failure to offer adequate 
assurances in response to a proper request under Article 71 is a repudiation justifying 
avoidance. 
 The developing countries at the Vienna Conference had serious problems with 
this doctrine of Anticipatory Breach for two reasons; 68 first, because the offending 
party would be too severely affected by denying him notice, and therefore the 
opportunity to offer adequate assurances before the other party may suspend or avoid 
the contract, and secondly, because the suspension appears to rely on subjective 
judgment which could be used by an unscrupulous trader to ‘gazump’ his opposite 
number, say for example in a rising market. 
 
(c) Partial Fundamental Breach 
 The interesting concept of ‘partial fundamental breach’ is introduced by 
Article 51. Four options arise: 
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1. to accept the goods furnished subject to a reduction on price or damages; 
2. accept the goods furnished in compliance with the contract, and demand 
substitute goods in respect to the defective goods, subject the right to claim 
damages; 
3. accept the conforming goods, and deem ‘partial fundamental breach’ in 
respect of the balance or; 
4. ‘avoid the contract in its entirety, but only if the failure to make complete 
delivery amounted to a fundamental breach of the entire contract’.69 
 
All the above remedies are available, with the exception of avoidance,70 in the event 
the other party fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this 
Convention. The test for fundamental breach is somewhat different. Whether the 
means of distinguishing between ‘fundamental breach’ and ‘on-fundamental breach’ 
is the best that could have been devised, given its history, is another matter. 
 
Conclusion 
 Grey areas abound in definition of ‘fundamental breach’ offered to us by the 
Convention. The ‘reasonable person’ test was introduced in an effort to make the 
Vienna Convention more objective than the ULIS. While it answers one question, it 
poses another. There is no indication whether the test is for a ‘reasonable man’ or a 
‘reasonable international businessman’, and which reasonable businessman, operating 
in which trading conditions. A reasonable businessman trading on the floor of a 
commodities exchange in New York will operate quite differently to the reasonable 
business man purchasing for a producers co-operative Yunnan province in of China, 
with whom he could conceivably have a direct transaction. 
  It would appear, therefore, that on the basis of the very few cases 
examined herein, that the autonomous code which was to be read, interpreted and 
applied in conformity through the application of uniform rules and principles with the 
primary objective of facilitating commerce,71 offering ‘a basis for the development of 
uniform international understanding’,72 has already exhibited flaws in its theory. The 
vastness of the objective behind the drafting of the Vienna Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (1980) cannot be underestimated. The Convention 
satisfies the needs of more countries and more legal systems around the world than 
any previous Convention, as evidenced by its adoption rate. Seen from the perspective 
of an English speaking European based Common Lawyer, flaws in the drafting can be 
found. The importance of the definition of fundamental breach as provided in Article 
25 of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 
can not be underestimated. 
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